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Abstract. Tezos is a smart-contract blockchain. Tezos smart contracts
are written in a low-level stack-based language called Michelson. In this
article we present Albert, an intermediate language for Tezos smart con-
tracts which abstracts Michelson stacks as linearly typed records. We
also describe its compiler to Michelson, written in Coq, that targets Mi-
Cho-Coq, a formal specification of Michelson implemented in Coq.
Keywords: Certified programming · Certified compilation · Program-
ming languages · Linear types · Blockchains · Smart contracts.
1 Introduction
Tezos is an account-based public blockchain and smart-contract platform. It was
launched in June 2018 and an open-source implementation is available [3]. The
Tezos blockchain distinguishes itself through its on-chain amendment procedure
by which a super-majority of stakeholders can modify a large part of the code-
base, through its liquid Proof-of-Stake consensus algorithm [2], and through its
focus on formal methods which is especially visible in the design and implemen-
tation of Michelson, its smart-contract language.
Indeed, the Michelson interpreter is implemented using a GADT that stat-
ically ensures the subject reduction property. Moreover, Michelson is formally
specified in the Coq proof assistant. This Coq specification is called Mi-Cho-
Coq [15] and its main application today is the certification of Michelson smart
contracts by deductive verification [7].
However, the stack paradigm used by Michelson is too low-level for com-
plex applications. For this reason, several high-level languages have been de-
veloped [5,14,6,9,12,13]. Unfortunately, their compilers to Michelson are not for-
mally verified which limits the application of formal methods for these languages.
In this article, we propose an intermediate language named Albert to avoid
the duplication of effort put into compilers to Michelson and to ease the cer-
tification of these compilers. The main feature of Albert is that the Michelson
stack is abstracted through named variables. The duplication and destruction of
resources are however explicit operations in both Albert and Michelson, this is
reflected in Albert by the use of a linear type system.
We have formally specified the Albert language in the Ott tool [18] from
which the Albert lexer, parser, and LATEX documentation are generated. Ott can
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also generate typing and semantic rules for Coq and other proof assistants. We
have written the Albert compiler in Coq as a function from the generated Coq
output for the Albert grammar to the Michelson syntax defined in Mi-Cho-Coq.
This article is organised as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the Michel-
son smart-contract language. Section 3 presents the Albert intermediate lan-
guage, the figures of this section have been produced by the LATEX output of
Ott. The Albert compiler is then presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses
some related work and finally Section 6 concludes the article by listing direc-
tions for future work.
The Albert specification and compiler are available at https://gitlab.com/
nomadic-labs/albert/tree/WTSC20.
2 Overview of Michelson
Smart contracts are Tezos accounts of a particular kind. They have private access
to a memory space on the chain called the storage of the smart contract, each
transaction to a smart contract account contains some data, the parameter of the
transaction, and a script is run at each transaction to decide if the transaction
is valid, update the smart contract storage, and possibly emit new operations
on the Tezos blockchain.
Michelson is the language in which the smart contract scripts are written. The
most important parts of the implementation of Michelson, the typechecker and
the interpreter, belong to the economic ruleset of Tezos which evolves through
the Tezos on-chain amendment voting process.
2.1 Design rationale
Smart contracts operate in a very constrained context: they need to be expres-
sive, evaluated efficiently, and their resource consumption should be accurately
measured in order to stop the execution of programs that would be too greedy,
as their execution time impacts the block construction and propagation. Smart
contracts are non-updatable programs that can handle valuable assets, there is
thus a need for strong guarantees on the correctness of these programs.
The need for efficiency and more importantly for accurate account of resource
consumption leans toward a low-level interpreted language, while the need for
contract correctness leans toward a high-level, easily auditable, easily formalis-
able language, with strong static guarantees.
To satisfy these constraints, Michelson was made a Turing-complete, low-
level, stack based interpreted language (a` la Forth), facilitating the measurement
of computation costs, but with some high-level features a` la ML: polymorphic
products, options, sums, lists, sets and maps data-structures with collection
iterators, cryptographic primitives and anonymous functions. Contracts are pure
functions that take a stack as input and return a stack as output. This side-effect
free design is an asset for the conception of verification tools.
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The language is statically typed to ensure the well-formedness of the stack
at any point of the program. This means that if a program is well typed, and if
it is being given a well-typed stack that matches its input expectation, then at
any point of the program execution, the given instruction can be evaluated on
the current stack.
Moreover, to ease the formalisation of Michelson, ambiguous or hidden be-
haviours have been avoided. In particular, unbounded integers are used to avoid
arithmetic overflows and division returns an option (which is None if and only if
the divisor is 0) so that the Michelson programmer has to specify the behaviour
of the program in case of division by 0; she can however still explicitly reject the
transaction using the FAILWITH Michelson instruction.
2.2 Quick tour of the language
The full language syntax, type system, and semantics are documented in [1], we
give here a quick and partial overview of the language.
Contracts’ shape A Michelson smart contract script is written in three parts:
the parameter type, the storage type, and the code of the contract. A contract’s
code consists of one block that can only be called with one parameter, but
multiple entry points can be encoded by branching on a nesting of sum types
and multiple parameters can be paired into one.
When the contract is deployed (or originated in Tezos lingo) on the chain, it
is bundled with a data storage which can then only be changed by a contract’s
successful execution. The parameter and the storage associated to the contract
are paired and passed to the contract’s code at each execution. The execution
of the code must return a list of operations and the updated storage.
Seen from the outside, the type of the contract is the type of its parameter,
as it is the only way to interact with it.
Michelson Instructions As usual in stack-based languages, Michelson instruc-
tions take their parameters on the stack. All Michelson instructions are typed
as a function going from the expected state of the stack, before the instruction
evaluation, to the resulting stack. For example, the AMOUNT instruction used
to obtain the amount in µtez (i.e. a millionth of a tez, the smallest token unit
in Tezos) of the current transaction has type 'S → mutez:'S meaning that for
any stack type 'S, it produces a stack of type mutez:'S. Michelson uses an or-
dered type system which means that the number of times values are used and
the order in which they are introduced and consumed matter and are visible
at the type level. Some operations such as SWAP :: 'a:'b:'S → 'b:'a:'S,
DUP :: 'a:'S → 'a:'a:'S, and DROP :: 'a:'S → 'S have to be used to
respectively change the order of the values on the Michelson stack, to dupli-
cate a value, and to pop a value from the stack without actually using it. Some
instructions, like comparison or arithmetic operations, exhibit non-ambiguous
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ad-hoc polymorphism: depending on the input arguments’ type, a specific im-
plementation of the instruction is selected, and the return type is fixed. For
example SIZE has the following types:
bytes:'S → nat:'S
string:'S → nat:'S
set 'elt:'S → nat:'S
map 'key 'val:'S → nat:'S
list 'elt:'S → nat:'S
While computing the size of a string or an array of bytes is similarly imple-
mented, under the hood, the computation of map size has nothing to do with
the computation of string size.
Finally, the contract’s code is required to take a stack with a pair parameter -
storage and returns a stack with a pair operation list-storage:
(parameter_ty*storage_ty):[] → (operation list*storage_ty):[].
The operations listed at the end of the execution can change the delegate
of the contract, originate new contracts, or transfer tokens to other addresses.
They will be executed right after the execution of the contract. The transfers
can have parameters and trigger the execution of other smart contracts: this is
the only way to perform inter-contract calls.
3 The Albert intermediate language
Michelson, as a stack-based language, is a difficult and unusual target for com-
piler writers. In addition to the usual effort to translate high-level constructions
to lower-level types and control-flow, they have to deal with stack manipulation
to make values available at the right stack position when calling an Michelson
opcode, and to cope with the consumption of values by the opcode execution.
These additional difficulties also hinder the effort of teams developing static
analysers and verification frameworks.
As a first simplification step, we have decided to build an intermediate lan-
guage that abstracts away the ordering of values in the stack and provides a
named binding to values. This intermediate language still keeps track of the re-
sources as variables are typed by a linear type system, which enforces each value
to be consumed exactly once. When a value is needed more than once, it must
be explicitly duplicated with a dup operation. Generation of dups is left to a
future higher-level intermediate language.
In the process of defining the language, we thought that it would also be
helpful to define some abstractions over the datatypes so we provide support for
records which compile to nestings of Michelson’s binary product type pair and
variants which compile to nestings of Michelson’s binary sum type or.
We also offer to define separate non-recursive function definitions used to
define programming libraries. These functions are inlined at compile time.
3.1 Base language
The Albert language is defined as a collection of small language fragments that
can be studied independently. Each fragment is defined in a separate Ott file.
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The first fragment to consider is called the base fragment. As its name suggests,
this fragment is the basis on top of which the other fragments are defined.
The base fragment contains the two main features of Albert: the stack is
abstracted by named variables and Michelson binary pairs are generalized as
records. We use the metavariable l to denote record labels and the metavariable
x to denote variables but these two notions are unified in Albert.
Records and linear typing As we have seen it Section 2.2, Michelson uses
an ordered type system that tracks both the order of the values on the stack
and the number of uses of the values. Most high-level languages however bind
values to named variables and implicitly handle the ordering and number of
uses of variables. The required stack manipulation instructions are introduced
at compile time. Albert is an intermediate language between these two extremes.
In Albert, the order of values is abstracted but not the number of uses which is
still explicitly handled.
This choice is reflected in Albert’s type system by the use of linear typing.
Each expression of the Albert language is typed by a pair of record types whose
labels are the variables touched by the instruction or expression; the first record
type describes the consumed values and the second record type describes the
produced values.
Thanks to the unification of variable names and record labels, records in
Albert generalize both the Michelson stack types and the Michelson pair type.
In the base fragment of Albert, all types are possibly-empty record types.
The grammar of types of the base fragment given in Figure 1.
label , l ::= Label / variable
| id
ty ::= Type
| rty Record type
rty ::= Record type
| {l1 : ty1; .. ; ln : tyn}
Fig. 1: Syntax of the record types
In the record type {l1 : ty1; .. ; ln : tyn}, we assume the labels to be distinct
and lexicographically ordered.
This constraint is formalized by the well-formedness judgement Γ ` ty de-
fined in Figure 2. The typing context Γ is always empty here but other cases for
typing contexts will be added in other language fragments.
The grammar for the base fragment is defined in Figure 3. Albert’s grammar
is more stratified than Michelson’s grammar because we adopt from imperative
languages the usual distinction between expressions and instructions. An instruc-
tion is either the noop instruction that does nothing, a sequence of instructions
separated by semicolons, or an assignment lhs=rhs where the left-hand side lhs is
either a variable or a record of variables and the right-hand side is an expression.
6 B. Bernardo, R. Cauderlier, B. Pesin, J. Tesson
Γ ` ty Type well-formedness
l1 < .. < ln
Γ ` ty1 .. Γ ` tyn
Γ `
Γ ` {l1 : ty1; .. ; ln : tyn}
Fig. 2: Type well-formedness judgment
Contrary to usual imperative expressions, arbitrary nesting of expressions is
not allowed and intermediate values should be named. This restriction, inspired
by the static single assignment form commonly used in intermediate compilation
languages, is designed to ease the production of Michelson code and to allow for
more optimisations at the level of the Albert language in the future. In practice,
this restriction means that an expression is either a variable x , a value val , the
application of a user-defined function to a variable f x , a record projection x .l ,
or a record update {var with l1=var1; ... ; ln=varn}.
instruction, I , ins ::= Instruction
| noop No operation
| instruction1; instruction2 Sequencing
| lhs=rhs Assignment
| drop var Resource dropping
lhs ::= Left-hand side of assignement
| var
| {l1=var1; .. ; ln=varn}
rhs ::= Right-hand side of assignments
| arg
| f arg
| var .l
| {var with l1=var1; ... ; ln=varn}
f ::= Function symbol
| dup
arg ::= Fun arg
| var
| value
| {l1=var1; ... ; ln=varn}
Fig. 3: Syntax of the base fragment
The type system of the base fragment is presented in figure 4. In the case
of instruction sequencing instruction; instruction ′, we do not want to restrict
instruction ′ to consume exactly the values produced by instruction. To avoid
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this limitation, we have added the framing rule Frame. This rule can be used to
extend both record types rty and rty ′ used for typing an instruction instruction
by the same record type rty ′′. This extension is performed by the join operator
, a partial function computing the disjoint union of two record types.
Operational semantics The semantics of the Albert base language is defined
in big-step style in Figure 5. The definition of this semantic relation is unsur-
prising because the base fragment is very simple and the type system does not
let much freedom at this point.
3.2 Language extensions
The full Albert language is obtained by adding to the base fragment that we have
just defined a series of language extensions. The main purpose of these extensions
is to reflect all the features available in Michelson. The only new main feature
compared to Michelson is the generalisation of the binary sum type or into n-ary
non-recursive variants with named constructors.
Albert’s variant types generalize the or, option, and bool types of Michel-
son. Variants are the dual of records, with the caveat that it is not possible to
construct an empty variant as Michelson does not have an empty type it could
correspond to. Variants offer two main operations to the user: constructing a
variant value using a constructor, and pattern-matching on a variant value.
Constructors are determined by a label, and applied as a function on a single
value. When constructing a variant value, the user must indicate the full type
of the variant value because the same constructor name is allowed to appear in
different variant types. We use the syntax [C1 : ty1 | .. | Cn : tyn] for the
variant type whose constructors are the C1, . . . ,Cn where each Ck expects an ar-
gument of type tyk . The types or a b, option a, and bool in Albert are aliases
for the variant types [Left : a | Right : b], [Some : a | None : {}] and
[False : {} | True : {}] respectively.
Pattern matching can be used on variants either as a right-hand side or as
an instruction. In both cases, the Albert syntax for pattern matching is similar
to the OCaml syntax of pattern matching; for right-hand sides, the syntax is
match x with | pattern_1 →rhs_1 | ... | pattern_n →rhs_n end.
3.3 Example: a voting contract
We present in figure 6 a simple voting contract written in Albert. The user of
the contract can vote for a predefined set of options by sending tokens and its
choice (represented by a string) to the contract.
The storage of the contract (line 1) is a record with two fields: a threshold
that represents a minimum amount that must be transferred to the contract for
the vote to be considered, and an associative map, votes, with strings as keys
(the options of the vote) and integers as values (the number of votes for each
associated key).
8 B. Bernardo, R. Cauderlier, B. Pesin, J. Tesson
Γ ` instruction : ty ⇒ ty ′
Instruction typing
Γ ` rty1
Γ ` rty2
rty  rty ′′=rty1
rty ′  rty ′′=rty2
Γ ` instruction : rty ⇒ rty ′
Γ ` instruction : rty1 ⇒ rty2 Frame
Γ ` noop : { } ⇒ {}
Γ ` instruction : ty1 ⇒ ty2
Γ ` instruction ′ : ty2 ⇒ ty3
Γ ` instruction; instruction ′ : ty1 ⇒ ty3
Γ ` rhs : a ⇒ b
Γ ` lhs : b ⇒ c
Γ ` lhs=rhs : a ⇒ c
Γ ` drop var : {var : ty} ⇒ {}
Γ ` lhs : ty ⇒ ty ′
Left-hand sides typing
Γ ` var : ty ⇒ {var : ty}
Γ ` {l1=x1; .. ; ln=xn} : {l1 : ty1; .. ; ln : tyn} ⇒ {x1 : ty1; .. ; xn : tyn}
Γ ` rhs : ty ⇒ ty ′
Right-hand side typing
Γ `a arg : ty ⇒ ty ′
Γ ` arg : ty ⇒ ty ′
Γ `a arg : ty ⇒ ty ′
Γ ` f : ty ′ ⇒ ty ′′
Γ ` f arg : ty ⇒ ty ′′
{l : ty}  rty=rty ′
Γ ` rty ′
Γ ` var .l : rty ′ ⇒ ty
Γ ` rty ′
{l1 : ty1; .. ; ln : tyn}  rty=rty ′
Γ ` {var with l1=var1; .. ; ln=varn} : {var : rty ′; var1 : ty1; .. ; varn : tyn} ⇒ rty ′
Γ ` f : ty ⇒ ty ′
Function symbol typing
Γ ` dup : ty ⇒ {car : ty; cdr : ty}
Γ `a arg : ty ⇒ ty ′ Argument typing
Γ `a var : {var : ty} ⇒ ty
Γ ` value : ty
Γ `a value : { } ⇒ ty
Γ `a {l1=x1; .. ; ln=xn} : {x1 : ty1; .. ; xn : tyn} ⇒ {l1 : ty1; .. ; ln : tyn}
Fig. 4: Typing rules for the base fragment
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lhs/val =⇒ val ′ Left-hand side evaluation
var/val =⇒ {var=val}
{l1=x1; .. ; ln=xn}/{l1=val1; .. ; ln=valn} =⇒ {x1=val1; .. ; xn=valn}
arg/aval =⇒ val ′ Argument evaluation
var/a{var=val} =⇒ val
val/a{ } =⇒ val
{l1=x1; .. ; ln=xn}/a{x1=val1; .. ; xn=valn} =⇒ {l1=val1; .. ; ln=valn}
f /val =⇒ val ′ Function symbol evaluation
dup/val =⇒ {car=val; cdr=val}
rhs/val =⇒ val ′ Right-hand side evaluation
arg/aval =⇒ val ′
arg/val =⇒ val ′
arg/aval =⇒ val ′
f /val ′ =⇒ val ′′
f arg/val =⇒ val ′′
{l=val}  rval=rval ′
var .l/rval ′ =⇒ val
{l1=val ′1; .. ; ln=val ′n}  rval=rval ′
{l1=val1; .. ; ln=valn}  rval=rval ′′
{var with l1=var1; .. ; ln=varn}/{var=rval ′; var1=val1; .. ; varn=valn} =⇒ rval ′′
instruction/val =⇒ val ′ Instruction evaluation
instruction/rval =⇒ rval ′
rval  rval ′′=rval1
rval ′  rval ′′=rval2
instruction/rval1 =⇒ rval2
noop/{ } =⇒ {}
I1/val =⇒ val ′
I2/val
′ =⇒ val ′′
I1; I2/val =⇒ val ′′
rhs/val =⇒ val ′
lhs/val ′ =⇒ val ′′
lhs=rhs/val =⇒ val ′′
drop var/{var=val} =⇒ {}
Fig. 5: Big-step operational semantics of the base fragment
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If the user sends less tokens that the threshold or if the parameter sent is
not one of the options (the keys of the votes map), then the call to the contract
will fail.
The contract contains two functions, vote and guarded_vote. Both functions
respect Michelson’s call conventions: they take as input the parameter and the
storage combined and return a list of operations and an updated storage.
vote checks that the parameter is one of the voting options (l. 9 and 10).
If not, the contract fails (due to assert some in l.10). Otherwise, the number of
votes associated to the parameter is increased by one (l. 11 and 12). vote returns
an updated storage as well as an empty list of operations.
guarded_vote, the main function, checks that the amount of tokens sent
(obtained with the amount primitive instruction l.21) is greater or equal to the
threshold (l.22). If so, then vote is applied. Otherwise, it fails.
1 type storage ty = { threshold : mutez; votes: map string nat }
2
3 def vote :
4 { param : string ; store : storage ty } →
5 { operations : list operation ; store : storage ty } =
6 {votes = state; threshold = threshold } = store ;
7 (state0, state1) = dup state;
8 (param0, param1) = dup param;
9 prevote option = state0[param0];
10 { res = prevote } = assert some { opt = prevote option };
11 one = 1; postvote = prevote + one; postvote = Some postvote;
12 final state = update state1 param1 postvote;
13 store = {threshold = threshold; votes = final state};
14 operations = ([] : list operation)
15
16 def guarded vote :
17 { param : string ; store : storage ty } →
18 { operations : list operation ; store : storage ty } =
19 (store0, store1) = dup store;
20 threshold = store0.threshold;
21 am = amount;
22 ok = am >= threshold0;
23 match ok with
24 False f →failwith ”you are so cheap!”
25 | True t →drop t;
26 voting parameters = { param = param ; store = store1 };
27 vote voting parameters
28 end
Fig. 6: A voting contract, in Albert
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4 Compilation to Michelson
4.1 Compiler architecture
Fig. 7: Compiler architecture: dashed frames designate generated component,
solid arrows represent relevant library dependencies.
As we want to be able to prove the correctness of our compiler in a near future,
we decided to implement it in Coq. This allows us to easily take advantage of
Ott’s definitions automatically translated to Coq, as well as to easily compile
to Mi-Cho-Coq’s AST. Moreover, using Coq’s extraction facilities, our compiler
transpiles to OCaml code, which is more efficient and easier to use as a library.
The global architecture of the compiler is depicted in 7. The compiler pipeline,
defined using OCaml glue code, roughly follows a classic architecture, notwith-
standing the peculiar tools used: the lexer-parser, automatically generated from
the grammar described in Ott, produces an AST which is then checked and
annotated by the typer, extracted from a Coq development. Then, the compila-
tion function, also written in Coq and extracted to OCaml, translates the typed
Albert AST into an untyped Mi-Cho-Coq AST. Finally, the extracted Mi-Cho-
Coq pretty-printer is used to produce a string which is a Michelson program,
and which the glue code dumps into a file ready to be injected in the Tezos
blockchain.
Typechecker The type checker phase can be divided in three steps.
First, type aliases declared by the user are replaced by their actual definition.
This will simplify the verification of type equivalence in the next phases, as we
will not have to worry about type variables. As declared types are simple aliases
- types can’t be recursively declared – this amounts to inlining the type aliases
wherever they are found in the program.
The second step normalises type declarations by sorting in lexicographic
order both the fields of records and the constructors of variants.
Finally, the third step checks that all defined functions are well typed. Cur-
rently, this type-checking proceeds in one pass from top to bottom and it does
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not perform any type inference. It checks the linearity of variable usage, the
compatibility of operands’ types with their operator and the exhaustiveness of
pattern matching. Each instruction is annotated with an input and output en-
vironments. The environment being a record type, associating a type to each
variable name. One can note here that this record type is actually a description
of the Michelson stack at each point of the program where position have been
replaced by names.
The type checker is defined as a Coq function, thus is a total function. Its im-
plementation uses an error monad to deal with ill-typed programs. If a program
does not type check, an error message is returned instead of the typed version
of the AST.
The lack of type inference is not too much of a limitation since the higher-
level languages that will target Albert have enough type information to produce
the explicit type annotations that are mandatory, as for example on variant
constructors.
4.2 Compilation scheme
To compile an Albert program to a Michelson program, we need first to convert
Albert’s types to Michelson’s types and Albert’s data to Michelson’s data, then
to translate Albert instructions to an equivalent Michelson sequence of instruc-
tions.
Types and data Because Albert’s primitive types reflect Michelson types,
their translation is obvious. Only the translation of records and variants is not
trivial. Records are translated into nested pairs of values, whereas variants are
translated into a nesting of sum types. For the sake of simplicity, we use a comb
shaped nesting, making access to records’ fields and size of variant constructor
linear in the size of the Albert type. A future task will be to provide a syntax to
control the shape of the Michelson translation or to use a balanced tree shape.
Instructions The compilation scheme of instructions is rather straightforward.
Projections of records fields are translated into a sequence of projections over
the relevant parts of a pair. Pattern matching over variants are translated into
a nesting of IF_LEFT branchings. Each branch of an Albert pattern-matching is
translated in Michelson and inserted in the associated position of the Michelson
IF_LEFT branchings tree.
At every point of the program we memorise a mapping from variable names
to their positions in the stack. Each operation is then translated to the equivalent
operation in Michelson, prefixed by DIG n operations that move the operands
on top of the stack, n being the index of the variables used as operands.
Function arguments are brought back on top of the stack if they are variables
and are pushed on it if they are literals. The Michelson translation of the function
is then inlined.
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Assignment instructions translate into a translation of the right hand side
computation, followed by a reordering of data, guided by the shape of the left
hand side: simple variable assignments DUG the result deeper in the stack for
later use, while record patterns translate to a pairing destruction and then some
stack reorganisation.
Our mapping from variable names to stack positions is currently naive and
enforces the invariant that the elements of the stack are ordered by the lexico-
graphic order of the variable names. This requires too much stack reorganisation
and will be later replaced by an optimising placement algorithm.
5 Related Work
Formal verification of smart contracts is a recent but active field. The K frame-
work has been used to formalise [11] the semantics of both low-level and high-
level smart-contract languages for the Ethereum and Cardano blockchains. These
formalisations have been used to verify common smart contracts such as Casper,
Uniswap, and various implementations of the ERC20 and ERC777 standards. A
formalization of Michelson in the K framework[19] is also under development.
Note also a formalisation of the EVM in the F* dependently-typed lan-
guage [10], that was validated against the official Ethereum test suite. This
formalisation effort led to formal definitions of security properties for smart con-
tracts (call integrity, atomicity, etc).
Ethereum smart contracts, written in the Solidity high-level language, can
also be certified using a translation to F* [8].
The Zen Protocol [4] directly uses F* as its smart-contract language so that
smart contracts of the Zen Protocol can be proved directly in F*. Moreover,
runtime tracking of resources can be avoided since computation and storage
costs are encoded in the dependent types.
The Scilla [16] language of the Zilliqa blockchain has been formalised in Coq
as a shallow embedding. This intermediate language is higher-level (it is based
on λ-calculus) but also less featureful (it is not Turing-complete as it does not
feature unbounded loops nor general recursion) than Michelson and Albert. Its
formalisation includes inter-contract interaction and contract lifespan properties.
This has been used to show safety properties of a crowdfunding smart contract.
Moreover, Scilla’s framework for writing static analyses [17] can be used for
automated verification of some specific properties.
In the particular case of the Tezos platform, several high-level languages
are being developed [5,14,6,9,12,13] to ease the development of smart contracts.
Formal specification is featured in the Archetype language[9], the specification is
then translated to the Why3 platform for automated verification. In Juvix[13],
dependent types can be used to specify and verify smart contracts and resources
are tracked in a similar fashion to Albert’s linear type system thanks to a variant
of quantitative type theory in Juvix’s core language.
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6 Conclusion and Future Work
The Albert intermediate language has been formally specified in a very modular
way using the Ott framework. This formal specification is the unique source from
which Albert’s parser (written in Menhir), Albert’s typechecker and compiler
(written in Coq) and the Section 3 of this article (written in LATEX) are generated.
The current implementation of the compiler is rather naive and we plan to
improve the performance of the produced code by sorting the values on the
Michelson stack not by the name of the corresponding Albert variable but by
their last use so that no work is performed after a variable assignment to dive it
back to its position in the stack. This will however add some complexity in the
compiler when several branches of a pattern-matching construction are joined
because we will need to permute the stack in all but one of them to recover
matching stack types in all branches.
The Coq versions of the language specification and the compiler open the
possibility of certifying the compiler correctness and meta-properties of the Al-
bert language such as subject reduction and progress. We have started proving
these properties in Coq to improve the trust in the Albert tools.
Finally, we would like to add to Albert a specification language and support
for deductive verification through the use of ghost code so that functional ver-
ification of Tezos smart contracts can be performed with the very high level of
confidence offered by Coq and Mi-Cho-Coq but at a higher level than Michelson.
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